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Five suspects arrested in the ICE raid on the Swift beef plant  
Greeley, Colorado.
Historically, american immigration policy has Been guided By three overarching principles: 1) the need to replenish the U.S. labor force; 2) a concern to secure 
U.S. borders from persons who threaten national security; and 
3) a humanitarian calling to open U.S. borders to those seeking 
to enter for occupational or familial purposes.
In the 12 years since the passage of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)1 and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (“IIRIRA”),2 immigration policy and enforcement in the 
United States have become dramatically unbalanced in favor of 
security concerns. This shift has been particularly marked since 
September 11, 2001. Immigration policy has become focused on 
the swift, if often haphazard and inaccurate, removal of persons 
whom government officials may believe are unlawfully present. 
The shift’s effects on persons, undocumented, documented, and 
citizens alike, have been dramatic, raising serious humanitarian 
and legal concerns.
President Barack Obama’s election provides an opportu-
nity to rebalance the focus of American immigration policy. 
Specifically, his administration has the chance to reverse four 
policies whose use has impacted immigrants’ human rights 
within the United States dramatically: 1) the increased criminal-
ization of persons detained for routine immigration violations; 
2) the dilution of due process rights for persons suspected of 
immigration violations; 3) the use of local police to enforce 
federal immigration law; and 4) the increased reliance on federal 
databases as a means of verifying employee’s employment eli-
gibility. While it cannot be expected that the new administration 
will eliminate these programs, one can be hopeful that some of 
the suggestions discussed below will be considered as part of a 
renewed focus on regaining the balance American immigration 
policy has lost.
i. reverSe tHe criminaLization of  
immigration enforcement
Chief among President Obama’s responsibilities will be 
to reverse the increased use of the criminal justice system to 
process alleged immigration offenders who otherwise would 
have passed through civil removal proceedings. To this effect, 
his administration should: 1) suspend Operation Streamline 
until a thorough review of its effectiveness, legality, and effect 
on human rights has been conducted; 2) reinstitute “Catch and 
Release” for all but those suspected of non-immigration related 
felonies; 3) eliminate quotas for Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) teams’ detentions; and 4) issue regulations 
implementing standards for immigration detention facilities. 
The implementation of Operation Streamline and increased 
use of quotas, in combination with the termination of Catch 
and Release, have created an overflow of detainees which the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has been unpre-
pared to handle, thereby creating various problems regarding 
adequate conditions and access to counsel.
In 2005, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection Unit (“CBP”) 
launched Operation Streamline, under which federal authorities 
charge virtually anyone detained for a suspected immigration 
violation with a misdemeanor immigration count and then 
detain him/her until deportation. In 2008, DHS prosecuted 
79,400 persons for immigration related offenses, a fivefold 
increase since 2000.
Likewise, in 2006, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff 
announced the end of the Department’s Catch and Release 
program, under which suspected immigration offenders were 
released under their own recognizance after arrest. In 2005, 
DHS detained approximately 34 percent of non-Mexicans for 
routine immigration violations. In 2006, over 99 percent were 
in custody.
In addition, DHS’s ICE branch has used quotas to drive up 
detentions. According to internal reports, in 2006, the agency’s 
fugitive operations program—originally intended to capture 
violent offenders—required local teams to detain 1,000 persons 
per year. Unable to meet quotas, agents have reached outside 
the program’s mandate. Approximately 73 percent of the nearly 
97,000 people arrested by ICE fugitive operations teams between 
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the program’s inception in 2003 and early 2008 were immigrants 
without criminal records. Arrests of immigrants with criminal 
convictions have steadily declined, accounting for just 9 percent 
of total arrests in 2007, down from 32 percent in 2003.
In some cases, teams have resorted to discriminatory enforce-
ment. According to a January 2009 lawsuit filed by CASA de 
Maryland, an immigrant advocacy non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO), ICE agents, during a January 2007 raid, surrounded 
a Baltimore 7-Eleven convenience store and subsequently 
detained all Latino patrons within the vicinity regardless of 
documentation or status. Meanwhile, persons of other races were 
not detained or questioned.
What makes these tactics even more troubling is that ICE 
lacks the facilities to account for the increase in detainees. 
Accordingly, ICE has delegated the responsibility for detaining 
suspected immigration offenders to privately owned prisons and 
local county jails which struggle to provide adequate supervi-
sion or medical care. At least 90 persons died while in ICE 
custody between 2003 and 2009. According to one internal 
study, medical staff members’ action or inaction, contributed to 
30 deaths. Only six of the detainees were 70 years or older; 32 
were under the age of 40.
By ICE estimates, one in four of the nearly 311,000 detain-
ees annually in ICE custody has a chronic health condition. 
Nonetheless, in 2007, Congress allocated merely 61 million 
dollars for the Department of Immigration Health Services 
(DIHS), and as of 2008, nearly 30 percent of all DIHS positions 
were unfilled. The Willacy County, Texas detention center—the 
country’s largest, with 2,018 detainees—lacks a clinical direc-
tor and a pharmacist, and has only one part-time psychiatrist 
on staff.
While, as a statutory matter, standards for medical care and 
detention of detainees exist, DHS has yet to issue regulations 
implementing the requirements. Accordingly, facilities have 
been left to interpret the relevant statutes on their own, leading 
to inconsistent and substandard results. Numerous groups have 
since filed petitions for rulemaking as allowed under section 
555 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),3 entitling 
them, at a minimum, to a response. In April 2008, the National 
Immigration Project filed suit alleging that Secretary Chertoff ’s 
failure to respond constituted an unlawful delay under sec-
tion 706(1) of the APA.4 In addition, where DHS has created 
system-wide standards, these standards are inadequate. For 
example, DHS standards provide that a detainee with a chronic 
condition may be treated only if the condition will affect his 
deportability.
Beyond the conditions in which they are detained, detainees 
are frequently transferred to and between detention centers and 
the 350 county jails with which ICE has contracted to house 
immigration suspects, thereby affecting their right to obtain and 
retain counsel. ICE facilities accommodate merely one in ten 
of all persons in custody, and only one in ten detainees is rep-
resented by counsel, while detainees increasingly face criminal 
charges as a result of Operation Streamline. Accordingly, these 
deprivations raise serious concerns over the right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The con-
sequences were apparent after ICE’s 2008 Pottsville, Iowa raid in 
which 389 immigrants were detained. Lacking adequate access 
to counsel, 297 of the individuals accepted pre-drafted plea bar-
gains within a week of their detention.
In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)5 requests pertaining to more 
than 200 immigration detention facilities, finding widespread 
problems. The problems faced by thousands of immigrants seek-
ing asylum or other legitimate claims to legal residency, included 
lack of access to telephones, attorneys, and legal materials.6 In 
July 2007, U.S. District Court Judge Margaret M. Morrow, in a 
nationwide permanent injunction, ruled that substantial evidence 
showed many facilities limited plaintiffs’ access to counsel by 
creating restrictions on telephone use, free calls to legal service 
providers, and in some cases, provided phones which could 
make only collect telephone calls.7 In addition, the court found 
that at multiple facilities, detainees were not given the right to 
meet with their counsel in private, were hindered by restrictive 
meeting hours, and were denied access to legal materials.8
ii. reStore due proceSS rigHtS
Related to the first set of policies will be the restoration 
of due process rights for persons in immigration proceedings. 
Specifically, the administration should: 1) restrict expedited 
removal to limited areas most dramatically affected by unlaw-
ful crossings; 2) annually review which areas are granted such 
authority; 3) create an independent body which monitors the 
expedited removal process, with a particular focus on asylum 
seekers; and 4) restore Matter of Lozada—guaranteeing an 
immigrant the constitutional right to effective counsel in a 
removal proceeding.
IIRIRA created expedited removal—a process by which 
a DHS officer, rather than an Immigration Judge, may find 
an individual removable. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”), ICE’s predecessor agency, initially applied 
expedited removal only to noncitizens arriving at ports of entry. 
On August 11, 2004, however, DHS published a notice expand-
ing expedited removal to all immigrants who: lack proper docu-
ments; have not been admitted or paroled following inspection 
by an immigration officer at a designated port of entry; are 
encountered within 100 miles of a U.S. border; and have not 
been physically present in the United States for fourteen days.9 
Expedited removal is generally not applied to nationals from 
Mexico or Canada.
The lack of independent judicial review means that the 
only recourse for an asylum applicant wishing to challenge a 
determination that they lack a credible fear of persecution if 
they return to their country of origin is DHS. If DHS engages 
in discriminatory practices, the review procedures provide no 
alternative. Even assuming discrimination plays no role, whether 
an individual is found to have a credible fear of persecution is 
based solely on the facts the asylum officer deems credible and 
relevant.
Legal scholars dispute whether persons subject to expedited 
removal have constitutional protection. As noted by the Orantes 
court, however, agents conducting expedited removal interviews 
have often failed to comply with even the minimal due process 
procedures that DHS requires. Government officials conduct-
ing expedited removal proceedings frequently fail to inform 
persons of their right to petition for asylum. At the San Ysidro 
entry point, only 9.7 percent of persons detained were informed 
of such right.10 This is particularly troubling in light of the fact 
that 38 percent of all immigrants placed in expedited removal 
proceedings are processed through the port.11 Further, the court 
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found that in ten percent of interviews, officers raised their voice 
and/or ridiculed immigrant interviewees.12
According to a United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom study, in at least one location, immigra-
tion officers forcefully encouraged asylum seekers to withdraw 
applications. Fifteen percent of asylum seekers were not given 
a credible fear interview despite expressing fear of returning to 
their country of origin. Further, asylum seekers were often inap-
propriately detained in jails or detention facilities with criminal 
inmates. Additionally, it was found that DHS confined one-third 
beyond 90 days.13
Due process protections outside of expedited removal have 
been weakened by former U.S. Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey’s recent administrative decision holding that an immi-
grant in removal proceedings has no constitutional right to 
challenge his or her hearing’s outcome if his or her counsel was 
ineffective.14 The ruling disposes of a 20-year-old precedent, 
established in Matter of Lozada that allowed immigrants to 
obtain a new hearing due to lawyer error under the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment.15 However, a detainee may still 
advance an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but he or she 
must prove that the deficiency was egregious and immigration 
judges have complete discretion in assessing such claims.16
iii. Limit LocaL enforcement of federaL 
immigration Law
The Obama administration must re-shift the responsibility 
for enforcement of immigration law away from local authorities 
back towards federal officials. Specifically, the Administration 
should: 1) rescind the 2002 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
opinion granting local officials the authority to enforce federal 
immigration law, and in its place reaffirm the OLC’s 1996 opin-
ion; 2) immediately halt the expansion of the 287(g) program; 
3) conduct a thorough review of discriminatory practices by 
each locality which has entered into a 287(g) agreement; and 
4) remove civil immigration warrants from the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) database. The increased delega-
tion, combined with Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive 
immigration reform, has encouraged cities to pass ordinances 
which they lack the expertise to enforce accurately; spurred 
discriminatory tactics by local officials; and deterred immigrant 
communities from reporting crime.
Congress has plenary powers “in determining what aliens 
shall be admitted to the United States, the period they remain, 
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms 
and conditions of their naturalization. Under the Constitution, 
the states are granted no such powers. . . .”17 A local regula-
tion of immigration, therefore, is preempted if it: determines 
who may remain in the United States; directly conflicts with a 
federal statute or regulation; or relates to a field Congress has 
preoccupied.18
In 2002, however, the Department of Justice (DOJ) com-
posed a memo encouraging state and localities to enforce fed-
eral immigration law under their alleged inherent authority.19 
In doing so, it explicitly rejected the constitutional preemption 
analysis from a similar 1996 memo.20 This, combined with 
the federal government’s failure to pass comprehensive immi-
gration reform, resulted in a steep rise in the number of local 
anti-immigrant initiatives around the country. According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, in 2007, 1,562 pieces 
of anti-immigrant legislation were introduced in all 50 states. 
Of these, over 240 passed in 41 states. This marked a dramatic 
increase from 2005, in which only 300 bills were introduced and 
39 were enacted.
Many mirror Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s “Illegal Immigration 
Relief Act” which a U.S. District Court struck down in 2007.21 
The ordinance, among other things, denies a license to a person 
who harbors or employs “unauthorized aliens.”22 In striking down 
the housing provision, the court explained the potential pitfalls of 
delegating immigration determinations to local officials:
The increased delegation [of immigration authority 
to local officials away from federal authorities], 
combined with Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive 
immigration reform, has encouraged cities to  
pass ordinances which they lack the expertise to enforce 
accurately; spurred discriminatory tactics by  
local officials; and deterred immigrant communities  
from reporting crime.
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Changing status from authorized to unauthorized is 
complex . . . . Some individuals can affirmatively apply 
for regularization of status. In other instances, regular-
ization of status is only available after an individual 
has been placed in removal proceedings . . . It may take 
months or years for an applicant to adjust status, obtain 
relief or otherwise regularize status. Submitting an 
application does not change an individual’s immigra-
tion status, even if the application is bona fide and will 
ultimately be approved. A person who is proceeding 
through the procedure to adjust his immigration status 
but who currently lacks immigration status frequently 
will not have any documents to indicate whether he has 
a valid claim to remain in the country.23
Some localities have gone further, entering Memorandums of 
Understanding with the federal government, commonly termed 
287(g) agreements, by which local officers are deputized to act 
as federal immigration agents. Originally created in 1996, locali-
ties expressed little interest prior to September 11, 2001. With 
former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s encouragement, 
however, 67 localities in 20 states have entered into such agree-
ments and 80 other localities have applications pending.24
Rather than pursuing violent offenders as proponents have 
proclaimed is the program’s objective, deputized agents have 
frequently used discriminatory traffic stops to detain suspected 
immigration offenders. For example, in May 2008, 83 percent 
of immigrants arrested in Gaston County, North Carolina by 
authorized agents were charged with traffic violations. In July, 
2008, the ACLU of Arizona filed suit against Sherriff Joe Arpaio 
of Maricopa County, who on multiple occasions, coordinated 
“crime suppression operations” in which all persons detained 
were of Latino origin.25
The suspicion of discriminatory intent has been buttressed 
by deputized officers’ statements. Arpaio praised as “patriotic” 
private groups, including the American Freedom Riders, that 
have harassed all Latino persons entering and leaving legal cen-
ters in the county.26 The Southern Poverty Law Center, a human 
rights group in Alabama, has categorized the American Freedom 
Riders as a nativist extremist organization, “meaning that it 
targets individual immigrants rather than immigration poli-
cies.” Likewise, Alamance County, North Carolina Sheriff Terry 
Johnson characterized Mexicans as follows: “Their values are a 
lot different—their morals—than what we have here. In Mexico, 
there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12, 13-year-old 
girl . . . They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico.”27
Even those localities which have not taken affirmative action 
against suspected illegal immigrants have been affected by 
the federal government’s decision to include civil immigration 
warrants in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
database. The NCIC database historically has included persons 
wanted for felony crimes such as murder and rape or serious 
misdemeanors. In 2002, DHS began entering into NCIC records 
persons with outstanding orders of deportation, exclusion, or 
removal. State and local police regularly access the database 
during the course of regular patrol duties. When a local police 
officer stops a driver for a traffic violation, for example, he or 
she may run the driver’s biographical information through the 
database to check for outstanding arrest warrants. If a warrant 
is found, ICE, then, issues a detainer allowing for the locality to 
detain the person for an additional 48 hours within which ICE 
must take custody of him/her.
This is problematic because the files on which the DHS 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) rely for immigra-
tion information contain errors. Accordingly, the inclusion of 
immigration warrants has undermined the validity of the NCIC 
database. The NCIC database is now considered so problem-
atic that it has been exempted from the Privacy Act’s accuracy 
requirements. While the national error rate of 42 percent is 
striking, St. Louis; Kansas City; Washington, D.C.; Greensville, 
South Carolina; and Shelby County, Tennessee had error rates 
of at least 60 percent when receiving a hit for an immigration 
warrant.
Furthermore, the perpetual fear that local officials may 
check their immigration status upon any interaction has deterred 
immigrant communities from reporting crimes. For example, 
in January 2009, José Sánchez laid fatally injured for almost 
20 minutes on a sidewalk in a predominantly Latino area of 
Washington, D.C., as more than 150 people walked past. Com-
munity residents and leaders said they were afraid to call authori -
ties for fear of being asked about their immigration status.
Not surprisingly, Hispanics also report significantly lower 
levels of confidence in local police. According to the Pew 
Hispanic Center, 61% of Hispanics say that they have a great or 
fair deal of confidence in police, compared with 78% of whites. 
Similarly, 46% of Hispanics report that they believe police will 
treat them fairly compared with 74% of whites.
In 2004, the National Council of LaRaza, the nation’s larg-
est Hispanic advocacy organization, filed suit alleging that the 
inclusion of civil immigration warrants: 1) required local offi-
cials to make civil immigration arrests which, under DeCanas v. 
Bica,28 they did not have the authority to make; and 2) violated 
Congressional guidelines which limit the type of information 
included in the database.29 While the Court initially denied 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in 2007, it dismissed 
the complaint for lack of standing.30
Similarly, in 2008, the ACLU of Northern California filed 
suit against Sonoma County and ICE alleging among other 
things that the issuance of immigration detainers to localities 
for immigrants who had not committed drug offenses exceeded 
ICE’s authority under the relevant federal regulations.31
vi. Limit reLiance on federaL dataBaSeS  
untiL tHeir accuracy iS verified
Finally, more generally, the Administration must limit its 
reliance on federal databases storing immigration information 
until their accuracy can be verified. Specifically, it should: 1) 
rescind Executive Order 13465 and related regulations requir-
ing most federal contractors to use the Basic Pilot Program 
or “E-Verify”; and 2) rescind recent “no-match” regulations 
creating a presumption of illegality for workers whose informa-
tion does not match that in the Social Security Administration’s 
(SSA) database. The federal government’s increased reliance on 
the SSA database has perpetuated the wrongful firing of numer-
ous individuals, increased discrimination, and burdened small 
businesses.
Basic Pilot, or E-Verify, is one of three voluntary elec-
tronic employment eligibility verification pilot programs 
Congress created under IIRIRA. Congress at the time instructed: 
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“[e]xcept as specifically provided in subsection (e) [referring to 
the required use of E-Verify by federal agencies, the Legislative 
Branch and certain immigration law violators], the Secretary of 
Homeland Security may not require any person or other entity to 
participate in a pilot program.”32
Regardless, in June 2008, former U.S. President George W. 
Bush issued Executive Order 13465, which mandates that public 
and private contractors and subcontractors that sign contracts 
with the federal government worth more than $100,000 and 
$3,000, respectively, use E-Verify to verify their employees’ eli-
gibility.33 A proposed rule implementing the order clarified that 
not only would employers be required to check the employment 
eligibility of all newly-hired employees, but also that of existing 
employees “assigned to the contract.”34
On December 23, 2008, the Chamber of Commerce and a 
group of contractors’ associations filed suit alleging that the 
mandate expressly violated IIRIRA’s limitations.35 On March 
18, 2009, the Obama administration delayed implementation of 
the rule until May 21, 2009, subject to its review of the man-
date.
Beyond the program’s legality, E-Verify’s error rates are 
well documented. According to the SSA, approximately 17.8 
million of its files include erroneous information; 12.7 million 
concerning U.S. citizens. The SSA’s Office of Inspector General 
reports that the SSA database has a 4.1 percent error rate. A 
DHS-commissioned report, released in 2007, found that 0.1% 
of native-born citizens and 10% of naturalized citizens would 
be tentatively non-confirmed because of erroneous data in DHS 
files. Accordingly, the report concluded that E-Verify “is still not 
sufficiently up to date” to meet the requirements for “accurate 
verification.”36
These problems are exacerbated by employers’ hesitation 
about hiring undocumented persons and the administrative cost 
associated with such challenges. Under the voluntary program, 
9.4 percent of employers failed to inform workers of a non-con-
firmation notice in 2007. Seven percent of those who did give 
notice, did not encourage employees to challenge the determina-
tion because of the process’s length.
Despite these problems, the Bush Administration expanded 
the use of the SSA database through other programs. Since 
1994, SSA has sent “no-match” letters to employers as a means 
of correcting information regarding employees who submit inac-
curate information.37 In previous years, the receipt of a no-match 
letter “[did] not imply that you or your employee intentionally 
gave the government wrong information about the employee’s 
name or Social Security number. Nor [did] it make any state-
ment about an employee’s immigration status.”38
In 2007, the Bush Administration issued a final rule enti-
tled “Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a 
No-Match Letter” cautioning that receipt of a no-match letter 
“may lead to a finding that an employer had . . . constructive 
knowledge” of an employee’s unauthorized status, thus sub-
jecting him or her to sanction under Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).39 The rule’s safe harbor provision 
allows an employer to avoid liability by checking his or her own 
records within 30 days and then asking its employee to submit 
verification of the information he or she originally submitted 
within 90 days.40
In 2007, the American Federation of Labor successfully per-
suaded a U.S. District Court in California to preliminarily enjoin 
the rule. The court explained that the rule was issued without 
any explanation as to the data the agency had considered, or its 
basis for concluding, in light of the SSA database’s error rate, 
why a letter was a reasonable indicator of illegality.41
Furthermore, DHS independently of DOJ, in contraven-
tion of IRCA, determined that if employers complied with the 
statute they would not be subject to discrimination claims.42 
Such concerns are not to be taken lightly. A 1990 Government 
Accountability Office report estimated that 461,000 employers 
began discriminating on the basis of national origin after the 
U.S. Congress created the first employer sanctions for hiring 
undocumented workers in 1986.43
Finally, DHS failed to conduct a final flexibility analysis 
even though the rule would have a significant impact on small 
businesses.44 A U.S. Chamber of Commerce commissioned 
analysis concluded that the total societal cost of the regulation 
would be 10 billion dollars per year, most of which would be 
felt by small business which have hired between 60 and 80 per-
cent of all new hires in the last ten years. In October 2008, the 
Bush Administration re-issued the rule, with additional analysis, 
unchanged.45
concLuSion
The myriad of policy changes required to rebalance American 
immigration policy are extensive. Likewise, the problems asso-
ciated with each of the programs discussed, and the methods 
which might be used to correct such problems, are diverse. 
Furthermore, combined with each of these, the Administration 
must also take proactive steps, including the adjustment of 
standards for a finding of family hardship, the creation of a 
viable path to citizenship, and most importantly, reversing trade 
policies which depress economic conditions in other countries, 
thereby motivating emigration.
The goal is to highlight those preliminary steps immigra-
tion reformers generally agree are necessary to change the most 
problematic programs. It is not yet clear what steps the new 
administration will take. President Obama’s decision to suspend 
the E-Verify requirement pending further review, and Secretary 
Janet Napolitano’s comprehensive review of DHS’s programs, 
provide hope for a new direction. That said, DHS’s furtherance 
of a lawful status requirement for driver’s licenses, and Secretary 
Napolitano’s support for Secure Communities, a national bio-
metrics database, have tempered enthusiasm. Ultimately, all 
advocates can be sure that they will have more of a voice in this 
Administration than the last, making policy recommendations 
all the more necessary.  HRB
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